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TRYING TO KILL ONE BIRD WITH TWO STONES:
THE USE AND ABUSE OF CLASS ACTIONS AND
COLLECTIVE ACTIONS IN EMPLOYMENT
LITIGATION
Thomas H. Barnard*& Amanda T. Quan
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1960s, shortly after the passage of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, class actions have played a significant role in shaping
employment law.' Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
2
which provides for the use of class actions, enabled the full enforcement
of Title VII and helped put a stop to widespread discrimination in
workplaces across the U.S. 3 Within the past decade, droves of plaintiffs
have filed class actions against their current or former employers
alleging all types of discrimination.4
A more recent development has been class and/or collective actions
5
under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). This is somewhat ironic
because the FLSA, which was passed in 1938, is considerably older than

Thomas H. Barnard is a shareholder at the law firm of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak
& Stewart, P.C.
Amanda T. Quan is an attorney at the law firm of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak &
Stewart, P.C.
1. See generally Melissa Hart, Will Employment DiscriminationClass Actions Survive?, 37
AKRON L. REV. 813 (2004) (discussing the evolution of class actions and employment
discrimination).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
3. See Hart, supra note 1, at 816-17 (explaining how "class action suits have been perhaps
the most important means for challenging and eliminating systemic employment discrimination, one
of the principal goals of Title VI',).
4. Nancy Levit, Megacases,Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 B.C.
L. REv. 367, 374-75 (2008) (stating that employment discrimination class actions filed in federal
court dropped in 1991 but began to rise again in 2006).
5. See Alfred B. Robinson, Jr., FLSA Lawsuits Continue to Rise, OGLETREE DEAKINS (July
30, 2012), http://blog.ogletreedeakins.com/flsa-lawsuits-continue-to-rise/#sthash.5ywMIFzr.dpuf
(stating that FLSA law suits continue to grow and set new records each year).
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.6 Even more surprising, it took fifty
years for collective actions to evolve as a tool used to enforce the
FLSA.7 Prior to the development of collective actions, the U.S.
Department of Labor was responsible for enforcing the statute under 29
U.S.C. §§ 217 and 216(c) of the Act.8 Individuals pursued claims, or
could pursue claims, under § 216(b) and, though attorneys' fees were
available, the private bar did not have much interest in pursuing such
cases. 9 That has all changed with the evolution and expansion of a new
type of growing litigation used to enforce the FLSA: the § 216(b)
collective action.' 0
Collective actions under the FLSA are significantly different than
traditional class actions under Rule 23, including available claims and
remedies, applicable procedures, and other administrative hurdles." In
an attempt to capture the best of both worlds, plaintiffs recently have
been attempting to combine Rule 23 "opt-out" class action claims and §
216(b) "opt-in" collective action claims within a single lawsuit.12 This
bold and somewhat contradictory strategy has created new legal
questions while breaking new ground in employment litigation.' 3
As plaintiffs filed more and more class action and/or collective
action lawsuits, and as plaintiffs realized more and more success in
properly using such representative actions, class actions and collective
actions became extremely popular and heavily-used means of pursuing
employment litigation. 14
Unfortunately, the inevitable occurred:
plaintiffs began misusing and abusing class action and/or collective
action lawsuits.
A significant and ever-changing body of law has developed through
6. See generally Jonathan Grossman, Fairlabor StandardsAct of 1938: Maximum Struggle
for
a
Minimum
Wage,
United
States
Dep't
of
Labor,
http://www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/flsal938.htm; Pre 1965: Events Leadingto the Creationof
EEOC, EEOC.COM, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/prel965/index.html (last visited June 14,
2014).
7. See Jared P. Buckley ET AL., Collective-Actions Breathe New Life into the FairLabor
Standard Act's Salary Test, 50 Wayne L. Rev. 905, 914-16 (2004) (explaining the history of
collective actions under the FLSA).
8. Wage and Hour Division History, Dep't of Labor (last visited June 22, 2014),
http://www.dol.gov/whd/about/history/whdhist.htm.
9. Thomas Barnard worked with the Department of Labor and did not see many case filings
initially.
10. See infra Part II.b.
11. See infra Part lI.b.
12. See infra Part I.f.
13. See infra Part I.f.
14. See Levit, supra note 4, at 376 (stating that certified class actions have a greater
likelihood of settling and that only three to six percent of all class action lawsuits are tried).
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the years, culminating in the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case, WalMart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes." After years of the overuse and misuse of
class actions in employment litigation, the court in Dukes finally put its
foot down and heightened the standard that plaintiffs must show in order
to achieve class certification. 6
Class actions and collective actions undeniably have both played
7
important roles in shaping employment litigation.1 However, the
overuse of such representative actions, and the increasingly overused
"shotgun" approach of simultaneously pursuing both types of claims in
employment litigation, has both degraded the effectiveness of the claims
8
as well as decreased the odds of a successful certification.'
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. TraditionalClass Actions UnderRule 23
"The class action is a procedural device intended to advance
judicial economy by trying claims together that lend themselves to
collective treatment. It is not meant to alter the parties' burdens of
proof, right to a jury trial, or the substantive prerequisites to recovery
under a given tort."' 9 For decades, class actions have played a
significant role in shaping employment law, and especially, employment
discrimination litigation.20 Many plaintiffs have utilized class actions as
a means of pursuing claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII") .21
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was adopted in
1938, and significant revisions modified the application of the rule in
1966.22 The "key innovation of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23" was
the creation of a presumption in favor of binding all class members who
23
do not affirmatively opt-out.
15. See infra Part II.a-b.
16. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550-52 (2011).
17. See infra Part H.a-b.
18. See infra Part l.g.
19. Blaz v. Beifer, 368 F.3d 501, 504 (quoting Southwestern Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d
425, 437 (Tex. 2000)).
20. See Hart, supra note 1, at 816-817.
21. Scott Shively, Resurgence of the Class Action Lawsuit in Employment Discrimination
Cases: New Obstacles Presented by the 1991 Amendments to the Civil Rights Act, 23 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 925,925 (2001).
22. See 97 AM. JUR. 3D ProofofFacts § 2 (2007).
23. JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:1
(10th ed. 2013) (citing FED. R. Ctv. P. 23(c)(3) ("Whether or not favorable to the class, the
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Shortly after the 1966 amendments took effect, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff in a Title VII case "was a private attorney
general, 'vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest
priority."' 2 4 Further, the Supreme Court stated that "[w]hen the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that enforcement would
prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon
private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the
law."25 Class actions allow for multiple individuals to initiate litigation
where individually they may not have otherwise been able to do so
without joining resources and support.
Following the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, plaintiffs began using
class actions as a popular method of pursuing litigation:
Despite the new rule's encouragement of courts to utilize class
actions, courts were reluctant at first to permit the certification
of sprawling class actions .... The courts' cautious attitude
changed in the mid-1980s. Responding to dockets clogged
with ... cases, courts became far more receptive to approving
major class actions ... . Class actions in the 1980s and 1990s
(and even into the 2000s) resulted in numerous multi-million
dollar and billion dollar settlements. Attorneys' fees for class
counsel-mainly from settlements-came under attack as being
excessive.

26

Plaintiffs often bring class actions under Rule 23 in order to pursue
claims of widespread employment discrimination.2 7 Class actions are
used by plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases brought under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and are viewed as a way of stopping

judgment in a class action must ... for any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), include and specify
or describe those to whom the Rule 23(c)(2) notice was directed, who have not requested exclusion,
and whom the court finds to be class members."); Amchem Prod., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
614-15 (1997) (noting that Rule 23's "most adventuresome innovation" was its authorization of
"class actions for damages designed to secure judgments binding all class members
save those who
affirmatively elected to be excluded"); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 399 n.8 (1975) ("The
certification of a suit as a class action has important consequences for the unnamed members of the
class. If the suit proceeds to judgment on the merits, it is contemplated that the decision will bind all
persons who have been found at the time of certification to be members of the class.").
24. See ProofofFacts,supranote 22, § 4 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,
390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968)).
25. Newman, 390 U.S. at 401.
26. Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REv. 729, 736-37
(2013) (citations omitted).
27. See Amchem Prod, 521 U.S. 591, 614; ProofofFacts,supra note 22, § 1.
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disparate impact discrimination and pattern or practice of intentional
discrimination claims.28 In general, class actions in employment
discrimination cases have generated equal employment opportunities by
providing solutions to widespread disparate impact discrimination as
well as relief for affected individuals.2 9
Class actions can be beneficial to plaintiffs as a more economical
means of pursuing a claim, and such class certification provides
3
defendant(s) with protection against multiple inconsistent judgments. o
There are also procedural advantages to pursuing a class action claim for
widespread employment discrimination. Once a class representative
exhausts administrative remedies available to him or her, all other
similarly situated class members may avoid dismissal for their individual
31
failures to exhaust administrative remedies. In addition, the filing of a
32
class action lawsuit may toll certain statutes of limitations.
Certain prerequisites must be satisfied before one or more
individuals may bring a class action. One or more individuals may sue
on behalf of a class of individuals who meet the numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements
set forth in Rule 23(a): one or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties
are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.33
The party seeking class certification bears the burden of
establishing the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
34
representation elements necessary to bring a class action.
In addition to these four prerequisites, in order for a lawsuit to be
28. Meghan E. Changelo, Reconciling Class Action Certification with the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 36 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 133, 133 (2002).
29. See ProofofFacts,supra note 22, § 1.
30. Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicate Litigation, 62 IND. L.J. 507, 510
(1987).
31. Proofof Facts, supra note 22, § 6 (citing Williams v. Tenn. Valley Authority, 552 F.2d
691, (6th Cir. 1977)); Bell v. Auto. Club of Mich., 80 F.R.D. 228, 234-35 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
32. See generally Rhonda Wasserman, Tolling: The American Pipe Tolling Rule and
Successive Class Actions, 58 FLA. L. REV. 803, 805 (2006).
33. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(a).
34. See, e.g., Arnold v. U.S. Theatre Circuit, Inc. 158 F.R.D. 439, 448 (N.D. Ca. 1994).
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eligible for class certification under Rule 23(b), one of the following
eligibility requirements must also be met: (1) the pursuit of separate
actions could lead to inconsistent adjudications or prejudice non-parties,
(2) the defendant has acted in a way that applies to all members of the
class, or (3) questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate. While subsection (b)(3) is generally intended for claims
seeking monetary relief, subsection (b)(2) was "intended to reach
situations where a party has taken action or refused to take action with
respect to a class, and final relief of an injunctive nature or of a
corresponding declaratory nature, settling the legality of the behavior
with respect to the class as a whole, is appropriate." 3 6 More specifically,
Rule 23(b)(2) "does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final
relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages."37 This
limitation has pushed some plaintiffs away from seeking certification
under subsection (b)(2). Although subsection (b)(3) was originally
thought to be the most complex and confusing portion of Rule 23, it has
now become the most common basis for certification.
Despite challenges to obtaining class certification, the class action
lawsuit has played a vital role in stopping and preventing widespread
employment discrimination. For example, in 1980, an assistant
professor at the University of Minnesota filed a class action lawsuit
alleging sex discrimination.39 Shyamala Rajender accused her employer,
the University of Minnesota, of discriminating against her on the basis of
her sex and national origin after she was turned down for a tenure-track
position. 40 As a result of her lawsuit, Ms. Rajender received $100,000
and the court prohibited the university from discriminating against
women on the basis of sex.4 1
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)-(3); Gammon v. GC Serv. Ltd., 162 F.R.D. 313, 317 (N.D. Ill.
1995).
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (advisory committee notes) (adding that although (b)(2) is not limited
to civil-rights cases, such cases are illustrative of that subdivision's intended application).
37. Id.; see also Changelo supra note 28, at 134 (citing Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.,
151 F.3d 402, 402 (5th Cir. 1998) ("The Fifth Circuit found that class certification under Rule 23
was not appropriate where plaintiffs requested both injunctive relief and compensatory damages
under the 1991 Act."). But see Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co, 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 951 (2002) ("[O]pen[ing] the door to class certification of employment
discrimination claims despite the availability of compensatory and punitive damages under the 1991
Act.").
38. Klonoff, supranote 26, at 792.
39. See Rajender v. Univ. of Minn., No. 4-73-435, 1979 WL 287, at *1 (D. Minn Aug. 14,
1979).

40.

Id.

41.

See Rajender v. Univ. of Minn., 546 F. Supp. 158, 170 (D. Minn. 1982).
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In 1981, the settlement of a class action race discrimination lawsuit
changed the examinations given to candidates for employment with the
42
African-American and
federal government's executive branch.
that the test had a
alleged
Hispanic applicants who had failed the exam
disparate impact on minorities.43
In December 1998, a mining company settled the first class action
sexual harassment lawsuit in America." Female employees alleged that
they were being harassed by their male co-workers, and that the
45
company was discriminating against them on the basis of their sex.
The case originally went to trial based on a theory of liability, and the
district court found the mining company liable on the female employees'
claims of sex discrimination in promotions to the position of "step-up
46
foreman" and foreman and the claims of sexual harassment. The court
required that the company educate all employees about sexual
harassment.47 A second trial, this time focused on damages only,
resulted in awards of approximately $10 thousand per plaintiff, but the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case on
damages.48 Before the next trial began, the company settled the case.
In April 2005, national retailer Abercrombie & Fitch finalized a
settlement for a large race and sex discrimination class action lawsuit,
which provided $50 million to minority and female applicants and
employees. 4 9 The plaintiffs in that case alleged that Abercrombie &
Fitch "violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by maintaining
recruiting and hiring practices that excluded minorities and women and
adopting a restrictive marketing image, and other policies, which limited

42. Luevano v. Campbell, 93 F.R.D. 68, 78, 80 (D.D.C. 1981).
43. Id. at 72.
44. Stephanie Carlson, Background on Class Action Suit, National Women's History
Museum, https;//www.nwhm.org/blog/background-on-class-action-suit/ (last visited Apr. 25, 2014);
see Suzanne Goldenberg, It Was Like They'd Never Seen A Woman Before, Guardian (Feb. 2, 2006),
www.theguardian.com/film/2006/Feb/03/gender.world; Stephanie Carlson, Background on the
Class Action Suit Brought Against Eveleth Mines, National Women's History Museum,
www.nwhm.orgfblog/real-women-of-north-country/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2014). See generally
Jensen v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1304 ( 8a Cir, 1997).
45. See Jensen, 130 F.3d at 1290.
46. Id.
47. Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 888-89 (D. Minn 1993).
48. Jenson, 130 F.3d at 1304.
49. Lief, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, $50 Million, Less Attorney's Free and Costs,
Paid to Class Members In December 2005 in Abercrombie & Fitch Discrimination Lawsuit
Settlement, AFJustice http://www.afjustice.com/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2014); Steven Greenhouse,
17, 2004),
Abercrombie & Fitch Bias Case Is Settled, N.Y. Times (Nov.
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B05EEDAl23FF934A25752CIA9629C8B63.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2014

7

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4
394

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31:387

minority and female employment."50 As part of the settlement, the
company was prohibited from targeting fraternities, sororities, or
specific colleges for recruitment, and was required to: work toward
certain "benchmarks" for the hiring and promotion of females and
minorities; advertise available positions in publications targeting
minorities; hire twenty-five recruiters focused on seeking minority and
female employees; set up a new Office and Vice President of Diversity;
provide diversity training for all employees with hiring authority; revise
performance evaluations for managers to include diversity goals as a
factor for bonuses and compensation and to include minorities in
marketing materials; and establish and follow a new internal complaint
procedure.5
In February 2007, a class action employment discrimination lawsuit
was successfully settled against a company for unlawful discrimination
against African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asians with respect to pay,
promotions, and training opportunitieS. 52
In May 2009, a class action race discrimination lawsuit resulted in a
successful settlement for African-American employees who had been
laid off after working for the company for short periods of time a threeyear consent decree prohibiting the company from engaging in future
discrimination and retaliation, the implementation of a policy against
race discrimination and retaliation and a procedure for handling
complaints of race discrimination and retaliation, the requirement that
the company provide training to employees regarding race
discrimination and retaliation, and the requirement that the company file
periodic reports to the EEOC regarding layoffs and complaints of
discrimination and harassment.
These examples and many more, illustrate the important role class
actions have played in the history and evolution of employment
discrimination litigation.

50. Press Release, EEOC, EEOC Agrees to Landmark Resolution of Discrimination Case
Against
Abercrombie
&
Fitch
(Nov.
18,
2004),
available
at
http://wwwl.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/release/l l-18-04.cfm?renderforprint--1.
51. Lief, Cabraser, Heimann & Bernstein, supra note 49.
52. Signficant
EEOC
Race/Color
Cases,
EEOC.GOV,
http://wwwl.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-race/caselist.cfn?renderforprint-- I (last visited
June 6,
2014) (citing EEOC v. Woodward Governor Company, No. 06-cv-50178 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2007)).
53. Id. (citing EEOC v. Area Erectors, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-02339 (N.D. Ill. May 29, 2009)).
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B. The FairLabor Standards Act And The Evolution Of Collective
Actions Under Section 216
Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act in 1938 to set federal
standards for minimum wage and overtime for employees as well as to
54
address general working conditions and prevent oppressive child labor.
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 was later passed to amend the FLSA to
prohibit sex discrimination in wages." In 1967, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act ("ADEA") was passed as an amendment to the
FLSA to prohibit discrimination against persons 40 years of age and
over.56 Originally, the ADEA prohibited age discrimination against
individuals between the ages of 40 and 65. In 1978, the age cap was
increased from 65 to 70.58 Finally, in 1986, the statute was amended to
remove the age cap altogether. Separate lawsuits seeking damages for
violations of the FLSA tend to yield limited awards for each individual
plaintiff.59 Thus, collective actions, when pursued as intended by
Congress, are essential to the proper enforcement of the FLSA.
An employer that violates the minimum wage or overtime
provisions of the FLSA may be liable to affected employees for unpaid
minimum wage and/or overtime compensation, as well as liquidated or
double damages.60 One or more employees may bring an action under
61
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of other similarly situated employees.
More specifically, Section 216(b) provides a private cause of action by
"one or more employees for and in behalf of himself or themselves and
other employees similarly situated" to recover for violations of the
FLSA. The "similarly situated" standard applicable to Section 216(b)
collective actions is less demanding than the Rule 23 class action
requirements:

54. Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§202, 206, 207, 212 (2006).
See Grossman,supra note 6.
55. Equal Pay Act (EPA) of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006).
56. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621, 631
(1967).
57. Brennan v. Paragon Employment Agency, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 286, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
("The Act was intended to alleviate the serious economic and psychological suffering of people
between the ages of 40 and 65 caused by widespread job discrimination against them.").
58. Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat.
189.
59.

Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat.

60.
61.

Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C.
Id.

82.
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[T]o maintain a collective action, a plaintiff bears the burden at
all times to demonstrate that the group of employees is similarly
situated. This burden, however, is lighter than "that for joinder
or for certification of a class action under Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 20(a) or 23." A plaintiff need only demonstrate that
his or her position is "similar, not identical" to the positions held
by the potential plaintiffs. 62
In order to participate in, and benefit from, a collective action under
section 216, an individual must actually opt in to the litigation by filing a
consent form: "No employee shall be a party plaintiff to any such action
unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such
consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought." 63 This
"opt-in" requirement stems, in part, from the overuse and/or misuse of
traditional "opt-out" class actions: "In part responding to excessive
litigation spawned by plaintiffs lacking a personal interest in the
outcome, the representative action by plaintiffs not themselves
possessing claims was abolished, and the requirement that an employee
file a written consent was added." 64 This specific "opt-in" requirement
separates collective actions from traditional class actions under Rule 23
where all individuals (or potential plaintiffs) within the definition of the
class are bound by the result unless they opt-out of the class.
In 2003, the Eleventh Circuit discussed the purpose behind the
"opt-in" procedures outlined in Section 216(b):
While employees still may sue on behalf of other employees
under § 216(b), the 1947 amendments did restrict their rights in
one important respect. The 1947 amendments added an "opt-in"
provision, which provides that "[n]o employee shall be a party
plaintiff to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing
to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in
which such action is brought." Congress's aim in adding the
"opt-in" language to § 216(b) was to "prevent[] large group
actions, with their vast allegations of liability, from being
brought on behalf of employees who had no real involvement in,
or knowledge of, the lawsuit." "The 'consent in writing'
requirement ... [sought] to eradicate the problem of totally
62.
27, 2014)
63.
64.

Espanol v. Avis Budget Car Rental, LLC., No. 8:10-cv-944-T-35-AEP (M.D.Fla. Mar.
(citations omitted).
29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
Hoffian-La Roche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 173 (1989).
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uninvolved employees gaining recovery as a result of some third
party's action in filing suit." Thus, the 1947 amendments to the
FLSA prohibit what precisely is advanced under Rule 23-a
representative plaintiff filing an action that potentially may
generate liability in favor of uninvolved class members.
The different standards applied in traditional class actions versus
66
collective actions under the FLSA have sparked debate for years.
Because collective actions under the FLSA have specific "opt-in"
procedures, there are often fewer plaintiffs involved, and thus,
potentially lower damages for defendants. 6 7 However, state wage-andhour laws provide an alternate avenue for recovery. 8 The difficulty
arises where plaintiffs try to "have their cake and eat it too" by bringing
both an "opt-out" class action under state wage-and-hour laws and an
"opt-in" collective action under the FLSA.
Employers often argue that state wage and overtime claims are
incompatible with federal FLSA claims because Rule 23 "opt-out" class
action procedures cannot be reconciled with Section 216 "opt-in"
collective action procedures.69 Courts previously were divided on
whether such differing claims could be combined in a single lawsuit.
For example, the Third Circuit previously held that there is an "inherent
incompatibility" between Rule 23 "opt-out" class actions and Section
216 "opt-in" collective actions. 70 However, in 2012, the Third Circuit
joined the majority of Circuits, including the Second, Seventh, Ninth and
District of Columbia Circuits, in allowing the combination of "opt-out"
class actions and "opt-in" collective actions.

65. Cameron-Grant v. Maxim Healthcare Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1240, 1248 (11th Cir. 2003).
66. See, e.g., Allan G. King, Lisa A. Schreter & Carole F. Wilder, You Can't Opt-Out of the
Federal Rules: Why Rule 23 Certification Standards Should Apply to Opt-In Collective Actions
Under

the

FLSA,

MASONLEC.ORG
2

200

6,

pt
http://www.google.com/url?q=http://masonlec.org/site/rteuploads/files/You% 52Can't/25
-Out%2520of/2520the%2520Fed%252ORules%2520%2520Rule%252023.pdf&sa=U&ei=KGO5U9ieC6
(last
HNsQSu9oDQDw&ved=0CCgQFjAC&usg-AFQjCNFvKOBBOLJzyHtb3RLZOPD2q0Kig
visited June 8, 2014).
67. See supra Part b.
68. Espenscheid v. Directsat U.S.A., L.L.C., 705 F.3d 770 ( 7 1, Cir. 2013) (bringing state
wage law claims under Rule 23 and FLSA claims under section 216(b)).
69. See De Asencio vs. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F. 3d 301, 307 (3rd Cir. 2003).
70. See id at 306; Bell v. Citizens Financial Grp., No. 10-0320, 2011 WL 2261117, at *5
(W.D. Pa. June 8, 2011).
71. See Knepper v. Rite Aid Corp., 675 F.3d 249, 261-62 (3d Cir. 2012); see also Shahriar v.
Smith & Wollensky Rest. Inc., 659 F.3d 234, 247-49 (2d Cir. 2011) ("[W]e agree with the Seventh
Circuit that... 'the 'conflict' between the opt-in procedure under the FLSA and the opt-out
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The FLSA does not provide a procedure for certifying a collective
action nor does it even define "similarly situated". 72 Through the years,
courts have developed a significant body of law regarding certification
of a collective action. In order to bring a collective action under the
FLSA, a plaintiff must first demonstrate the existence of a group of
"similarly situated" individuals.73 This initial threshold requires only a
"modest factual showing" and is fairly lenient.7 4 A plaintiff only needs
to prove a "reasonable basis" for his or her claim that there are other
similarly situated employees.
If the plaintiff satisfies this minimal
initial inquiry, the court may certify a "conditional" class of individuals
who may then opt in.76 Notice may be sent to similarly situated potential
plaintiffs who may decide to opt in.77
Following the opt-in period and possible discovery by the parties,
the court will once again examine, usually upon a defendant's motion to
decertify the collective action, whether the plaintiffs are sufficiently
"similarly situated" to allow the collective action to continue. At this
stage in the litigation, maintenance of the collective action requires a
greater showing than at the initial stage. Several courts have adopted
the following two-tiered process in making that determination:
Under this two-tiered analysis, [t]he first determination is made
at the so-called "notice stage." At the notice stage, the district
procedure under Rule 23 is not a proper reason to decline jurisdiction . . . ."); Ervin v. OS Rest.
Servs., Inc., 632 F.3d 971, 976-79 (7th Cir. 2011) ("There is ample evidence that a combined action
is consistent with the regime Congress has established in the FLSA."); Wang v. Chinese Daily
News, 623 F.3d 743, 760-61 (9th Cir. 2010), vacatedon other grounds, 132 S. Ct. 74 (2011) ("We
follow Lindsay in concluding that it was within the district court's discretion to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the [state law] claim in this case."); Lindsay v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co.,
448 F.3d 416, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("While there is unquestionably a difference ... between opt-in
and opt-out procedures, we doubt that a mere procedural difference can curtail section 1367's
jurisdictionalsweep.").
72. See O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., 575 F.3d 567, 584 (6th Cir. 2009).
73. See Federal Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
74. See Foster v. Food Emporium, No. 99 CIV 3860 CM, 2000 WL 1737858, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2000); Jackson v. New York Telephone Co., 163 F.R.D. 429, 431 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); Frank v. Gold'n Plump Poultry, Inc., No. Civ. 041018JNERLE, 2005 WL 2240336, at *3 (D.
Minn. Sept. 14, 2005); Espanol v. Avis Budget Car Rental L.L.C., Case No. 8:10-cv-944-T-30AEP,
2011 WL 4947787, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2011); Rubery v. Buth-Na-Bodhaige, Inc., 569 F.
Supp. 2d 334, 336 (W.D.N.Y. 2008); Realite v. Ark Rest. Corp., 7 F. Supp. 2d 303, 306 (S.D.N.Y.
1998); Scholtisek v. Eldre Corp., 229 F.R.D. 381, 387 (W.D.N.Y. 2005).
75. See Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 551 F.3d 1233, 1260-61 (11th Cir. 2008).
76. See id.at 1258-61.
77. See id at 1259.
78. See id. at l261.
79. See id. at 1261-62.
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court makes a decision-usually based only on the pleadings
and any affidavits which have been submitted-whether notice
of the action should be given to potential class members.
Because the court has minimal evidence, this determination is
made using a fairly lenient standard, and typically results in
"conditional certification" of a representative class. According
to some courts, certification at the notice stage requires nothing
more than substantial allegations that the putative class members
were together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.
Under this approach, the district court then makes a second
determination after discovery is largely complete and the case is
ready for trial. At this stage, the court has much more
information on which to base its decision, and makes a factual
determination on the "similarly situated" question. Thus courts
generally analyze the "similarly situated" issue under a higher
standard at this stage. If the plaintiffs are similarly situated, the
district court allows the case to proceed to trial as a collective
action under § 216(b).o

80. Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 996 F. Supp. 1071, 1080 (D. Kan. 1998) (citations
omitted); see also Blake v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. 4:11 -CV-592, 2013 WL 3753965, at *3 (S.D.
Tex. July 11, 2013) ("Like most district courts, this Court has generally adopted the two-stage
approach . . . consisting of (i) a notice stage, followed by (ii) a decertification stage."). Under the
Lusardi approach, in the notice stage, the district court first makes a preliminary determination
whether potential plaintiffs are similarly situated to the named plaintiff. Blake, 2013 WL 3753965,
at *3.
If they are, then the court conditionally certifies the action and authorizes notice to
potential plaintiffs to opt in, and the suit "proceeds as a representative action throughout
discovery." The second stage comes after discovery is largely complete and the
defendant files a motion for decertification. If the court determines from discovery
evidence that the plaintiffs are in fact similarly situated, then the case proceeds as a
representative action. But if the court finds that the plaintiffs are not similarly situated,
then the class is decertified, the opt-in plaintiffs are dismissed without prejudice, and the
original plaintiff proceeds to trial on his individual claims.
Id. Roberts v. Target Corp, No. CIV-1 1-0951-HE, 2013 WL 5256867, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 17,
2013) (quoting Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095 (10 Cir. 2001) ("[A] court
determines, on an ad hoc case-by-case basis, whether plaintiffs are "similarly situated." In utilizing
this approach, a court typically makes an initial "notice stage" determination of whether plaintiffs
are "similarly situated." In doing so, a court 'require[s] nothing more than substantial allegations
that the putative class members were together the victims of a single decision, policy, or plan.' At
the conclusion of discovery (often prompted by a motion to decertify), the court then makes a
second determination, utilizing a stricter standard of "similarly situated." During this "second
stage" analysis, a court reviews several factors, including '(1) disparate factual and employment
settings of the individual plaintiffs; (2) the various defenses available to defendant which appear to
be individual to each plaintiff, (3) fairness and procedural considerations; and (4) whether plaintiffs
made the filings required by the ADEA before instituting suit.")).
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Although a court's initial inquiry as to whether plaintiffs are
"similarly situated" requires only a "modest factual showing," some
courts have denied certification following discovery based upon
insufficient proof at the second stage of the analysis. 8 1 Other courts
choose to bypass the initial conditional certification stage altogether and
proceed directly to the second stage of the certification analysis. 82
C. Other Collective Actions in Employment Law
Age discrimination claims raised under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act also may be brought as collective actions.
More
specifically, while discrimination claims raised under Title VII are
governed by Rule 23 class action procedures, employment cases brought
under the FLSA, the ADEA, and the Equal Pay Act, as collective
actions, are governed by Section 216(b).84
D. Wal-Mart v. Dukes Case: Rule 23 Commonality Requirement
Prior to 2011, class actions and collective actions were more and
more frequently being used by plaintiffs as a "shotgun approach" to
pursuing larger awards. Class actions and collective actions often were
81.
Thiessen, 996 F. Supp. at 1080; (citing Bayles v. American Med. Response, 950 F. Supp.
1053, 1067 (D. Colo. 1996) ("[D]ecertifying class in FLSA context where the case was 'fraught
with questions requiring distinct proof as to individual plaintiffs' and defenses could not be
addressed on a class-wide basis")); Brooks v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 164 F.R.D. 561, 569 (N.D.
Ala. 1995) (denying certification in part because the "circumstances of employment termination are
diverse" and the court "would be faced with numerous individualized defenses," including waiver
issues); See also Botero v. Commonwealth Limousine Serv. Inc., No. 12-10428-NMG, 2014 U.S.
Dist. WL 1248158, at *6 (D. Mass. Mar. 25, 2014) ("[E]ach would be class member, were he or she
to file a separate complaint, could provide sufficient proof to survive summary judgment, yet that
fact alone would not be sufficient to render such class members "similarly situated.").
82. Nieddu v. Lifetime Fitness, Inc., No. H-12-2726, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 5530809, at *4
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2013); see, e.g., Aguirre v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., No. H-05-3198, 2007 U.S.
Dist. WL 772756, at *9 (S.D. Texas Mar. 12, 2007); Blake, 2013 WL 3753965, at *4-6; Valcho v.
Dallas Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 574 F. Supp. 2d 618, 622 (N.D. Texas 2008); Morisky v. Pub. Serv. Elec.
& Gas Co., Ill F. Supp. 2d 493, 497-98 (D.N.J 2000).
83. See 29 U.S.C § 626(b) (2000) ("The provisions of [the ADEA] shall be enforced with the
powers, remedies, and procedures provided in section[] ... 216 (except for subsection (a)
thereof)....").
84. James M. Fraser, Opt-in Class Actions Under the FLSA, EPA, and ADEA: What Does It
Mean to Be "Similarly Situated"?, 38 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 95, 97 (2004); Candis A. McGowan, The
ABCs of Title VII Class and Age Discrimination Collective Actions, 25 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 257,
262 (2001).
85. See, e.g., Edwards v. Prime, Inc., No. 08-AR-1016-S, 2008 WL 9393800, at *1 (Dec. 11,
2008) (making it impossible for the court to certify a collective class because of the convoluted

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol31/iss2/4

14

Barnard and Quan: Trying to Kill One Bird with Two Stones: The Use and Abuse of Cla
CLASS ACTIONS AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

2014]

401

misused in attempts to apply them to a broader group of individuals than
was permitted by Rule 23's commonality requirement. After years of
plaintiffs overusing and misusing class actions in employment litigation,
the Court in Dukes finally put its foot down and heightened the standard
of what plaintiffs must show in order to achieve class certification.
In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the commonality
requirement under Rule 23 In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, current
and former employees of Wal-Mart sought injunctive and declaratory
relief, punitive damages, and backpay on behalf of themselves and 1.5
million female employees alleging sex discrimination in pay and
More specifically, the women alleged that pay and
promotions.
promotion decisions were largely subjective and discretionary, and that
90
such decisions had an unlawful disparate impact on female employees.
The district court and the Ninth Circuit both certified the class of
women, finding that the plaintiffs met Rule 23(a)(2)'s commonality
requirement and that their claims for backpay could be certified as part
of a (b)(2) class because those claims did not predominate over the
claims for equitable relief.9' On June 20, 2011, the Supreme Court
reversed the Court of Appeals decision, holding that (1) certification of
the plaintiff class was not proper under Rule 23(a), and (2) plaintiffs'
backpay claims were not properly certified under Rule 23(b)(2). 92
Plaintiffs had moved to certify a plaintiff class consisting of "[a]ll
women employed at any Wal-Mart domestic retail store at any time
since December 26, 1998, who have been or may be subjected to WalMart's challenged pay and management track promotions policies and
practices."93 In evaluating the commonality requirement under Rule
23(a)(2), the Supreme Court noted that the "language is easy to misread,
since '[a]ny competently crafted class complaint literally raises
'common questions."' 94 The Supreme Court succinctly scrutinized
plaintiffs' proof of commonality: "Here respondents wish to sue about
literally millions of employment decisions at once. Without some glue
holding the alleged reasons for all those decisions together, it will be
shotgun complaint).
86. Hamm v. TBC Corp., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
87. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550-52 (2011).
88. See Id. at 2550-51.
89. Id at 2547-48.

90.

Id

91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 2549-50.
Id. at 2561.
Id. 2549 (quoting Pl.'s Mot. for Class Certification 37).
Id at 2551.
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impossible to say that examination of all the class members' claims for
relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I
disfavored."95
Although the plaintiffs alleged that "Wal-Mart's "policy" of
allowing discretion by local supervisors over employment matters" leads
to disparate impact in favor of men, the Supreme Court noted that the
very policy itself "is just the opposite of a uniform employment practice
that would provide the commonality needed for a class action . . . [and]

is also a very common and presumptively reasonable way of doing
business."96 Further, the Supreme Court held that Rule 23(b)(2) "does
not authorize class certification when each class member would be
entitled to an individualized award of monetary damages" because
plaintiffs with individual claims for monetary damages should be given
the opportunity to decide for themselves whether or not to join the
class.97
Although many plaintiffs point to the fact that the Supreme Court
was divided on the issue of commonality, it must not be overlooked that
the Court ruled unanimously on other issues, including the fact that the
case was improperly certified under Rule 23(b)(2) because claims for
monetary relief may only be certified, if at all, under Rule 23(b)(3). 9 '
Many courts have cited and attempted to interpret Dukes.99 Indeed,
Dukes is seen as a landmark case with regard to a heightened standard
for proving commonality and has sparked much discussion in the legal
community.100
Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Dukes,
95. Id. at 2552 (emphasis in original).
96. Id. at 2554.
97. Id. 2557, 2559.
98. Id. at 2557-61.
99. See Mary Dunn Baker, Class CertificationStatistical Analysis Post-Dukes, 27 ABA J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 471, 481 (2012).
100. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to
Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 463-64 (2013); Sergio J. Campos, Proof of Classwide Injury, 37
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 751, 754-56 (2012); John M. Husband & Bradford J. Williams, Wal-Mart v.
Dukes Redux: The Future of Sprawling Class Action, 40-SEP COLO. LAW. 53 (2011); Suzette M.
Malveaux, The Power and Promise of Procedure: Examining the Class Action Landscape After
Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 62 DEPAUL L. REv. 659, 661 (2013); Anthony F. Fata, Doomsday Delayed:
How the Court's Party-NeutralClarificationofClass CertificationStandards in Wal-Mart v. Dukes
Actually Helps Plaintiffs, 62 DEPAUL L. REv. 675, 675-76 (2013); Marcia L. McCormick,
Implausible Injuries: Wal-Mart v. Dukes and the Future of Class Actions and Employment
Discrimination Cases, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 711,711-12 (2013); L. Camille H6bert, The Supreme
Court's 2010-2011 Labor and Employment Law Decisions: A Large "Mixed Bag" for Employers
and Employees, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 279, 280 (2011); Suzette M. Malveaux, How Goliath
Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 34, 37-38
(2011); Julie Slater, Comment, Reaping the Benefits of Class Certification:How and When Should
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plaintiffs may struggle to continue successfully bringing employment
discrimination class action suits. The Court's ruling in Dukes certainly
has brought an end to the frivolous filing of improper class action
lawsuits.
E. Application ofDukes to Collective Action Lawsuits
Although collective actions have allowed for the growth of lawsuits
seeking recovery under the FLSA, the Supreme Court's holding in
Dukes may restrict potential plaintiffs' eligibility to file both class
actions and collective actions. So why does the holding in Dukes matter
to the evolution of collective actions? Some courts have held that the
Rule 23 requirements do not apply to a group of "similarly situated"
individuals seeking to bring a collective action.'o' However, others hold
that collective action plaintiffs must meet the Rule 23 class action
requirements.10 2 Thus, the holding in Dukes underscores the importance
of determining whether the stringent Rule 23 class action requirements
apply.
F. A New Type Of Case: The Hybrid
Lawsuits that combine Section 216(b) "opt-in" collective actions
with Rule 23 "opt-out" class actions give rise to unique difficulties.
"Opt-in" rules generally reduce the number of applicable members while
"opt-out" rules significantly increase the number of participating
members.' 0 3 As discussed above, courts have been divided as to whether
these two types of actions can be brought in a single lawsuit and whether
plaintiffs can move for dual certification.'0 Not surprisingly, much
debate has arisen regarding the seemingly contradictory requirements of
class actions and collective actions:

"Significant Proof' Be Required Post-Dukes?, 2011 BYU L. REv. 1259, 1259-61 (2011); Saby
Ghoshray, Hiyacked by Statistics, Rescued by Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Probing Commonality and Due
Process Concerns in Modern Class Action Litigation, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 467, 468-471 (2012);
Jennifer Brooks-Crozier, Put Up Your Dukes: The Fight Over Commonality in the Era of Wal-Mart
v. Dukes, 19 TEX. WEsLEYAN L. REv. 711, 711-12 (2012).
101. See Robert P. Davis & David S. Fortney, MANAGING WAGE & HOUR RISKS 2010, 261-62
(2010).
102. See, e.g., Shushan v. Univ. of Colo., 132 F.R.D. 263, 265 (D. Colo. 1990); see also
Wilkerson v. Martin Marietta Corp., 875 F. Supp. 1456, 1461 (D. Colo. 1995).
103. See Andrew C. Brunsden, Hybrid Class Actions, Dual Certification, and Wage Law
Enforcement in the FederalCourts, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 269, 274 (2008).
104.

See id. at 275.
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The need for clarification of this issue took on greater
significance in 1966, when the Supreme Court's Advisory
Committee revised Rule 23 to resemble its modem form. Prior
to the revision, class action plaintiffs were not bound by a
judgment unless they affirmatively opted into the suit. Like the
pre-1966 version of Rule 23, § 216(b) also requires plaintiffs to
opt in. When the Advisory Committee revised Rule 23,
however, it replaced the "opt-in" requirement with Rule
23(b)(3), which provides that absent parties are automatically
included in the suit unless they affirmatively opt out. As a
result, Rule 23's opt-out provision was directly at odds with the
FLSA's opt-in requirement. This distinction is central to the
debate of whether courts should apply Rule 23's certification
requirements to collective actions under §216(b).os
Violations of the FLSA come in many different shapes and sizes:
some employers fail to pay the federally mandated minimum wage,
while others fail to maintain adequate records of hours worked; some
employees are not compensated or given for rest and meal periods, while
others do not receive overtime pay because they are misclassified as
exempt employees. o0 For years, the FLSA was not strictly enforced,
and employers were able to get away with noncompliance. 107
The interplay between the "opt-in" collective action under the
FLSA and the "opt-out" class action under Rule 23 has the potential to
create different, and potentially contradictory, classes within one single
lawsuit. Plaintiffs attempting to bring state law wage claims under Rule
23 and collective actions under the FLSA are essentially trying to "have
their cake and eat it too." For example, Rule 23 allows for the tolling of
statute of limitations pending class certification, and the statute of
limitations is similarly tolled for class members when one single plaintiff
files an employment discrimination claim. 08 On the other hand, the
filing of a lawsuit under the FLSA generally does not toll the statute of
limitations, only the filing of a consent by the individual will toll the
statute of limitations.' 09 Plaintiffs cannot be allowed to "cherry-pick"
the benefits from both class actions and collective actions while seeking
105. Fraser, supra note 84, at 96.
106. See
Wage
and
Hour
Division
(WHD),
http://www.dol.gov/whd/flsalindex.htm (last visited on April 23, 2014).
107. See Brunsden, supra note 103, at 272.
108. Davis & Fortney, supra note 101, at 264.
109. See id. at 265.
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to avoid the limitations of both.
G. Post-Dukes Employment Litigation

There have been a growing number of wage and hour cases all
across the country."o Statistics relating to federal case loads confirm
this recent trend."' Even a quick review of cases within the last month
illustrates this quickly growing trend. For example, in March 2014,
Walgreens paid $23 million to settle nine class actions under the
FLSA.11 2 A Florida plaintiff and more than 100 opt-ins who were
employed as shift managers requested second-stage class certification,
3
which was granted against Avis Budget Car Rental LLC." JPMorgan
Chase & Co. has agreed to pay $16 million to settle a proposed class and
collective action lawsuit regarding overtime pay.1 4 Plaintiffs in a wageand-hour class action lawsuit were granted class certification by a
federal district court judge in New York.' 11 KeyBank recently agreed to
pay $3.5 million to settle a class and collective action alleging that the
company misclassified certain employees." 6
Class actions are extremely popular and heavily-used means of
pursuing employment litigation because Plaintiffs, and their class action
attorneys, often see class actions as an easy way to maximize damages
while minimizing effort' 17

110. See Robinson, supra note 5.
111. See id. ("One obvious reason for the increase is that plaintiffs' lawyers are still finding
FLSA violations to litigate. Also, the recovery of liquidated damages and attorneys' fees, especially
in cases brought as collective or class actions, makes FLSA cases lucrative and attractive for the
plaintiffs' bar. Economic uncertainties contribute to this growing trend of more wage and hour
litigation by employees; and plaintiffs' lawyers are able to take advantage of these uncertainties,
especially by bringing lawsuits as collective or class actions.").
112. See Allissa Wickham, Walgreen Shells Out $23Mto Settle Wage Class Actions, LAW360
(Mar. 26, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/522119/walgreen-shells-out-23m-to-settle-wageclass-actions.
113. Ben James, Collective Status Affirmed in Avis Budget OT Suit, LAw360 (Mar. 27, 2014),
http://www.law360.com/articles/522530/collective-status-affirmed-in-avis-budget-ot-suit.
114. Jeff Sistrunk, JPMorganPays $16M to Settle Bankers' OT Class Action, LAW360 (Mar.
52
25, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 1813/jpmorgan-pays-16m-to-settle-bankers-ot-classaction.
115. Jackson v. Bloomberg, L.P., No. 13 Civ. 2001 (JPO), 2014 WL 1088001, at *1, *18
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2014).
116. Jeff Sistrunk, KeyBank to Pay $3.5Mto Settle FLSA, Unpaid OT Claims, LAW360 (Mar.
14, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/518775/keybank-to-pay-3-5m-to-settle-fisa-unpaid-otclaims.
117. See Creative Montessori Learning Ctr. v. Ashford Gear, L.L.C., 662 F.3d 913, 915 (7th
Cir. 2011).
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Certification as a class action can coerce the defendant into
settling on highly disadvantageous terms, regardless of the
merits of the suit .

...

As explained in Szabo, "the class

certification turns a $200,000 dispute (the amount that Szabo
claims as damages) into a $200 million dispute. Such a claim
puts a bet-your-company decision to Bridgeport's managers and
may induce a substantial settlement even if the customers'
position is weak."'"s
Courts have commented on "the effect of a class certification in
inducing settlement to curtail the risk of large awards."" 9
As we all know, with great power comes great responsibility.
Unfortunately, over the years, plaintiffs, and their class action counsel,
increasingly have abused the class action process, to the point that
certain plaintiffs' attorneys have even been sanctioned for recruiting
plaintiffs in order to bring such lawsuits.120 Finally, in 2011, the U.S.
Supreme Court called for the end of improper and misused class action

lawsuits.121

In the years following the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Dukes,
other courts have similarly denied requests for class certification,
imposing a heightened standard for class certification.12 2 For example,
in 2012, the California Supreme Court denied class certification of a
proposed subclasses relating to work "off-the-clock." 23 Five hourly
employees sought to bring wage-and-hour claims against companies that
owned and operated restaurant chains throughout California on behalf of
cooks, stewards, buspersons, wait staff, host staff, and other hourly
employees who staff the restaurants.124 The court decertified the
plaintiffs' proposed subclass covering "Class Members who worked
'off-the-clock' or without pay from and after August 16, 2 0 0 0 ."I25
118. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7"'
Cir. 2011)).
119. West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 937 (7th Cir.2002).
120. But see Reliable Money Order, Inc. v. McKnight Sales Co., Inc., 704 F.3d 489, 490-91
(7th Cir. 2013) (finding that the district court's certification of a class would not be invalid based
solely on the improper actions of counsel).
121. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547, 2556 (2011).
122. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426, 1428-29, 1435 (2013); Bolden v. Walsh
Constr. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 896-97 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing an order certifying two multi-site
classes, finding no commonality among proposed class members); Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d
1206, 1228 (10th Cir. 2013); Camilotes v. Resurrection Health Care Corp., 286 F.R.D. 339,
345-46,
354 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
123. Brinker Rest. Corp. v. Superior Court, 273 P.3d 513, 521 (Cal. 2012).
124. Id at 521.
125. Id at 522.
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doing so, it held that plaintiffs failed to rebut the company's policy,
which generally prohibits "off-the-clock" work.126 Where plaintiffs only
provided "anecdotal evidence of a handful of individual instances in
which employees worked off the clock, with or without knowledge or
27
awareness by [defendants'] supervisors," certification is not proper.1
In February 2013, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decertified
class and collective actions brought by three named plaintiffs, who
28
installed and repaired home satellite dishes for the defendants.1 The
plaintiffs alleged various violations of federal and state wage-and-hour
laws.129 The state law claims were brought as Rule 23 class actions
while the claim under the FLSA was brought as a collective action under
Section 216(b).1 30 Where monetary damages were sought under the
class actions and the collective actions, and where specific hours worked
by 2341 technicians would need to be addressed, the court held that
granting certification would be infeasible.131
In May 2013, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a district
court's denial of a plaintiffs motion for class certification, where the
would-be class covered female job applicants denied employment as
entry-level sales representatives.13 2 The court refused to certify the
proposed class, in part, because the plaintiff failed to establish
commonality under Rule 23 where "the plaintiff ... could not show that
a number of women, who failed to obtain employment at many places,
over a long time, under a largely subjective hiring system, shared a
common question of law or fact." 3 3 The court held that the fact "that
subjective decisions made by some of [the defendant's] managers
favored males because of [the defendant's] male-dominated corporate
34
Quoting the
culture" is insufficient to warrant class certification.1
somehow
can
plaintiff
a
"[u]nless
that
held
court in Dukes, this court
mode of
common
show that the corporation's managers all used 'a
exercising discretion that pervades the entire company,' ... '[a] party
seeking to certify a nationwide class will be unable to show that all the
employees' Title VII claims will in fact depend on the answers to

126.

Id.at 544.

127.
128.

Id. at 544.
Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, L.L.C., 705 F.3d 770, 771-72, 777 (7th Cir. 2013).

129.

Id. at 771.

130.
131.
132.

Id
See id at 772, 776.
Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 479-80 (6th Cir. 2013).

133.

Id. at 489.

134.

Id. at 488.
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1 35
common questions."'
On March 27, 2014, the Western District of New York ruled on a
class and collective action alleging that a health care network failed to
pay hourly employees for all hours worked and/or overtime for hours
worked over forty hours per week.'36 The district court denied the
plaintiffs' motion for Rule 23 class certification and their motion to
finally certify a FLSA class, and granted the defendants' motion to
decertify the plaintiffs' conditionally certified FLSA collective action.137
The court noted that Rule 23's class action requirements do not apply to
a court's approval of a collection action under FLSA.138 The court first
analyzed the plaintiffs' request for certification of the state law claims
under Rule 23 and held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the
commonality requirement.' 39 Next, after examining whether the
plaintiffs and the opt-in plaintiffs were similarly situated, the court
decertified the conditional FLSA collective action and dismissed the
claims of the opt-in plaintiffs.140
While plaintiffs continue to file class actions and collective actions
in an attempt to maximize damages, the "glory days" for plaintiff class
actions have come to an end. Beginning with Dukes, courts have put
their collective feet down at improper requests for certification. Courts
are no longer tolerating the seeming abuse and misuse of class actions
and collective actions.

III. CONCLUSION
Class actions in employment litigation have a rich history of
eradicating and preventing widespread discrimination in the
workplace.141 Indeed, class actions have been instrumental in bringing
an end to such intolerable workplace environments.142 However, over
the years, plaintiffs, and their attorneys, have increasingly abused the
class action process.143 In the aftermath of Dukes, plaintiffs are no
longer able to obtain class certification so easily, requiring class action
135. Id. (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2454-2455 (2011)).
136. Hinterberger v. Catholic Health Sys., No. 08-CV-380S, 2014 WL 1278919, at *1
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2014).

137.
138.

Id. at *34.
Id. at *23.

139.
140.

Id. at *25, *30, *32.
Id. at *33-34.

141.

See supra Part I.

142.
143.

See Hart, supra note 3, at 816-17.
Hamnn v. TBC Corp., 597 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
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attorneys to more seriously assess whether certification is proper.
Similarly, collective actions have also played an important role in
45
the development of better working environments for employees.1
Collective actions have been essential in securing employee rights and
preventing employer abuses, especially in the areas of minimum wage,
overtime, meal breaks, donning and doffing, and related situations
within the workplace.146 Such actions have brought a new and focused
approach to wage and hour laws; however, they too have been abused

and misused.147

Despite the valuable roles that class actions and collective actions
have served in getting rid of widespread workplace discrimination and
unlawful employer practices, Dukes signaled the end of the "one-size-fit48
This
all," "shotgun approach" utilized by class action attorneys.1
a
proper
not
is
and
courts
by
welcomed
longer
no
is
"shotgun approach"
use of class actions or collective actions. There is certainly a place for
class actions and collective actions in employment litigation. However,
plaintiffs must be judicious and thoughtful when seeking class
certification in these post-Duke days using a "rifle approach" aimed at
specific abuses by employers.

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See supra Part I.g.
See supra Part I.
See Buckley, supra note 7, at 914-16.
Hamm, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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